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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
SALT LAKE CITY, a
municipal corporation,
vs.

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

UNITED PARK CITY MINES
COMPANY, a corporation,

Case No.
11948

Defendant and
Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE

This case involves the contention by Plaintiff Salt
Lake City that certain underground workings (the Spiro
Tunnel and various workings connected therewith)
located in the Park City, Utah area and owned by Defendant United Park City Mines Company are intercepting and diverting waters which Salt Lake City
claims would otherwise be contributing to the flow of
Big Cottonwood Creek.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

After approximately three full weeks of non-jury
trial resulting in the introduction of 179 highly technical exhibits and witnesses' testimony filling over 2,100
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pages of transcript, the trial court issued a 143-page
l\Iemorandum Decision ( U. 152-2!)5) and entered 156
pages of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(R. 316-471). The conclusions reached therein were as
follows: (a) Plaintiff Salt Lake City (hereinafter
sometimes referred to as the ''City") hears the burden
of proving that there has been an unnatural decrease
in the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek since the driving
of the Spiro Tunnel; and ( b) Plaintiff failed to sustain
that burden ( R. 471). Accordingly, the trial court en·
tered Judgment in favor of Defendant ::m<l against
Plaintiff of no cause of action (R. 472-73). There·
after the court entered an Order overruling Plaintiff's
Objections to Findings of Fact, Conc1usions of Law,
and Judgment and an Order denying Plaintiff's Mo·
tion for New Trial (R. 474). Plaintiff subsequently
filed a timely Notice of Appeal from those Orders and
the earlier Judgment (R. 488).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant seeks an af firmance of the Judgment
and Orders from which Plaintiff has appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The volume and complexity of the evidence which
was presented to the trial court in this case makes vir·
tually impossible the summarization here of all f
j
pertinent in this appellate proceeding. :Moreover, since
many facts are closely tied to the various poin.ts
·discussed in the Argument section, infra, such material
would be more appropriately considered in that portion
of this Brief. Accordingly, set forth here are only those
facts which establish the framework necessary for an

I
1

..'
I
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understanding of the more detailed material supplied
below.
Big Cottonwood Canyon is approximately 12 miles
in length and rnns in an east-west direction. At its
westerly end is the Salt Lake Valley and at the east it
terminates at a ridge (Scott's Pass) which forms the
divide between the Big Cottonwood and the Thaynes
Canyon drainage areas. At the east end of Big Cottonwood Canyon is the Brighton Bowl. The 50.54 square
miles which comprise the canyon area are drained by
Big Cottonwood Creek and its tributaries. ( R. 324-26).
Since 1899 Salt Lake City has operated various
devices at the mouth of the canyon to measure the flow
of Big Cottonwood Creek at that point. Since 1916
the City has also operated a rating station known as
Argenta about five miles upstream from the mouth. Of
the 50.54 miles making up the Big Cottonwood drainage area, 29.10 lie above Argenta. (R. 324-25, Tr. 52528) . For some time a measuring device known as the
"Stairs" has been operated just below Argenta by Utah
Power and Light. (Tr. 542).
The parties are not in disagreement regarding
Plaintiff's rights in Big Cottonwood Creek flow. Salt
Lake City owns all outstanding water rights relating
to the creek except 8.16% of the primary rights, 27.78%
of the surplus rights, and 1.90% of the nonirrigation
season rights. The City's water rights with respect to
Big Cottonwood Creek are measured by percentages
of flow and, accordingly, any interference with the
total natural flow would necessarily interfere with the
City's interests.
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'The Thaynes Canyon drainage area is on the other
side of the divide from Big Cottonwood Canyon. From
Scott's Pass, which is the eastern terminal of the Big
Cottonwood area, Thaynes Canyon begins a four-mile
descent to the northeast. Unlike Big Cottonwood Can.
yon, which drains to the west, Thaynes Canyon drains
northeasterly into the East Canyon drainage and
eventually
. into the 'Veber River. It is under the Thavnes
.
Canyon drainage area that the Spiro Tunnel lies.
(R. 32.5, Tr..528).
The portal of the Spiro Tunnel is situated near
Park City, Utah and is located at the northern end of
Crescent Ridge, the mountain which forms the east side
of Thaynes Canyon. The tunnel was begun in July,
1916. lly 1923 it had been completed to its present face,
which is 15,.536 feet from the portal and approximately
1,800 feet beneath the surface. The average grade of
the tunnel is 14 of 1 %. It was driven into the mountain
on a course of South 28° 38' West and does not change
direction until reaching 13,935 feet from the portal. At
that point the tunnel turns southerly to its face. (R. 327,
330).

For the first 30 to 50 feet of its length, the Spiro
Tunnel traverses a shallow layer of alluvium. (R. 328).
It then enters, in order, the solid rock of the following
four geologic formations:

The Thaynes Formation. The Thaynes Forma·
·tion surrounds the tunnel for its initial 2,765 feet. The
Thaynes is relatively previous and consists of varying
layers and lenses of calcareous sandstone, sandy
stones, and shales. The average dip of the formation JS
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about 20° to the north and the strike averages North
50° 'Vest. In traversing the Thaynes the Spiro Tunnel
encounters a nnmher of rather minor faults, most of
which are nearly imperceptible. There is no significant
displacement in that section of the Thaynes through
which the tunnel is driven. ( R. 328).

The T:V oodsidc Shale. A four-foot displacement
to the southeast exists at the contact between the
Thaynes and the Woodside Shale. The tunnel extends
from that contact for 5, 135 feet before leaving the
Woodside. The formation consists of varied colored,
finely grained, and thinly laminated beds of shale. Its
dip and strike conforms to that of the overlying
Thaynes Formation. In that part of the Woodside traversed by the tunnel there are several small fissure
faults, each having a displacement of only a few inches.
A maximum displacement of three and one-half feet
occurs 6,430 feet from the portal. (R. 328-29).
The Parle City Formation. For the next 4,800
feet of its length the Spiro Tunnel is driven through
the Park City Formation. The final portion of that
formation encountered by the tunnel is 12,700 feet from
the portal and about 1,600 feet below the surface of
Thaynes Canyon. The Park City consists of interbedded
limestone, sandstone, quartzite, and shale and includes a
130- to 165-foot thick layer of exceedingly impervious
black carbonaceous shale. The bottom part of that impervious layer is 500 feet from the contact between the
Park City and the underlying Weber Quartzite Formation. The dip and strike of the Park City conforms to
that of the Thaynes and Woodside. ( R. 329-30) .
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The 11"'ebcr Quartzite F'ormation.
From the i
12,700-foot station to its face, a distance of 2,836 feet
the Spiro is driven into the 'Veher Quartzite. The'
'V eber Quartzite consists of relatively fine-grained
quartzite with some interhedding of limestones and a
few calcareous shales. The formation is very brittle
and fractures easily, but contains very little faulting.
Some fracturing exists along the tunnel. The dip and
strike of the 'V eher conforms to the dip and strike of
the overlying formations. ( R. 329-30).
Extending from the Spiro Tunnel or from certain
of its principal offshoots are the following major work·
mgs:

The 1057 Cross Cut. A 600-foot tunnel known as
the 10.57 Cross Cut commences 10,570 feet from the
Spiro portal and runs easterly to the 'Vest End Shaft
of the SilYer King l\Iine. The cross cut was driven between December, 1925 and June, H>26 to enable the
removal of water from the Silver King l\Iine by pump·
ing it up the "rest End Shaft and into the cross cut,
where it flowed by gravity into and out of the Spiro.
.The 'Vest End Shaft was raised up mo feet from the
lower mine workings and tops out in the 1057 Cross
Cut. 1I'he bottom of the shaft iR in the \V chcr Qunrtiite.
Its top and all of the 1057 Cross Cut are in the Park
City Formation. (R. 331-32).
The 137 Cross Cut. A tunnel known as the 137
Cross Cut commences at a point 13,700 feet from the
Spiro portal and extends southeasterly for approximate·
ly 4,000 feet to and beyond the Silver Hill Shaft. That
shaft bottoms in the cross cut and tops out 800 feet
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i above in the Alliance Tunnel. Horizontal mine work-

ings are connected with the shaft at 100-foot intervals.
The cross cut is now closed beyond the Thaynes Shaft.

In Hl38 the Thaynes Shaft was constructed from
a point in the 137 Cross Cut approximately 800 feet
from the Spiro Tunnel. The shaft begins in the 'V eber
Quartzite and, in rising some 1,800 feet to the surface,
traverses the Park City, \\Toodside Shale, and Thaynes
Formations. ( R. 332-33).

1'he 143 Drift. The 143 Drift commences 14,300
feet from the portal of the Spiro and runs in a westerly
and northwesterly direction. It was begun in May, 1927
and was completed to its present face, 6,700 feet from
its intersection with the Spiro, in 1933. A second branch
was completed in 1934. ( R. 327-28, 334). Both branches
terminate in the vicinity of the \Vestern :Monitor Shaft.
(H. 439). The drift begins in the \Veber Quartzite and
extends into the Park City Formation. Only the initial
3,600 feet traYerse Defendant's present property; the
remainder extends onto the holdings of the Silver King
Western Company. In 1949 a cave-in occurred near the
beginning of the 143 Drift and since that time it has
been inaccessible. ( R. 334).
In 1917 the first water in the Spiro Tunnel was
encountered 2,765 feet from the portal, at the contact
between the Thaynes and lV oodside Shale Formations.
Initially the flow was .88 cubic feet per second ( cfs),
but it diminished to .25 cfs. The next water encountered
Was seepage from the 'V oodside Shale in that portion
of the tunnel between 4,394 and 6,600 feet from the
portal. With this seepage, encountered between October,
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HH7 and l\Iay, 1918, the flow at the portal increased
to 2.0 cfs. (R. 33.5). In the case of Silver King Consol.
Jlining Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah 2!)7, 39 P.2d 682 (1984),

water users in the 'V eber Hiver drainage area (the Park
City side of the mountain) were held, as against De·
fendant's predecessor in interest, to have the right to
the above-described waters. Because such water users
were not made parties to the present action, Defendant
moved to dismiss for failure to join indispensable
parties. In response to that motion, the City disclaimed
any interest in the waters originating in the first G,600
feet of the Spiro. Accordingly, Defendant's motion
was denied and thereafter this litigation was not con·
cerned with the waters intercepted by the first 6,600
feet of the tunnel. (H. 3]!)-20, 335).
The next sigi1ificant water was encountered in
l\Iarch, 1920 when the tunnel reached 12,520 feet from
its portal. At that point the tunnel face was in the Park
City Formation and below the black shale layer thereof.
Small seeps were encountered as the Spiro was driven
through the remaining 500 feet _of the Park City and
into the 'Veber
to a point, reached in Decem·
ber, rn21, 15,014 feet from the portal. At that time
total tunnel flow was 10 cfs. 'Vith the tunnel's comple·
ti on in 1923 its flow had dropped to 7 cfs. ( R. 33:5-86).
'V ater encountered in the 143 Drift augmented
the tunnel flow and in l !)3.3, the year during which the
drift was completed, flow at the Spiro portal reached its
maximum of 22 cfs. However, between 1929 and 1949
from I to 9 cfs were being pumped up the West End
Shaft from the Silver King .Mine, and a portion of
total Spiro flow during the period is attributable to
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that source. During the years after 1933 drainage from
the 143 Drift gradually diminished until in 1949 it had
been reduced to 2.6 cfs. Construction of the Thaynes
Shaft in 1938 added to the tunnel flow. ( R. 336) . In
no workings other than those mentioned in this and in
the two preceding paragraphs was water encountered
which contributed to tunnel flow. (R. 336).
From 1933 to :March, 1936 total flow steadily decreased until it reached 13.2 cfs. Between l\Iarch, 1936
and July, 1944, total flow at the portal averaged between 12 and H cfs. Between the latter date and January, 1951 no flow records were maintained. From 1951
to 1966 flow at the portal varied between 6.2 and 9.8
cfs. ( R. 339-40).
Various evidence introduced by each of Plaintiff
and Defendant helped establish the factual framework
summarized above, and the case presented by each party
had as its base the above facts. Due to the nature of
the attack Plaintiff has attempted to launch against the
trial court's decision, additional pertinent facts are more
appropriately discussed below.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. AS FORMULATED AND APPLIED,
THE BURDEN-OF-PROOF RULE ADOPTED
BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS, WITH RESPECT
TO THE CITY, THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS
ONE POSSIBLE.

Salt Lake City was the plaintiff in this action. Defendant filed no counterclaim and sought no affirmative relief whatsoever against the City. N otwithstanrling

I
I
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these considerations, in connection with the pre-trOl
conference Plantiff made the assertion that in this case,
unlike in most lawsuits, the burden of proof rested on
Defendant, and that to carry its burden Defendant was
required to establish that the waters intercepted by the
Spiro Tunnel would not otherwise contribute to Big
Cottonwood Creek. Plaintiff's position on the point was
grounded upon the three cases summarized below.
In JI ountain Lake 1llining Co. v. ftlidway Irr. Co.,

47 Utah 346, 149 P. 929 ( 1915), a mining company

sued users having rights to the flow of Snake Creek
to quiet its title to waters encountered during the driv·
ing of a tunnel. The tunnel paralled the bed of the
creek and its portal was but a few feet from the stream,
\Vhen large volumes of water were encountered by the
tunnel, the flmv of several springs which theretofore
had contributed to the creek immediately diminished and
subsequently ceased. In hol<ling that the defendant
users had the right to waters issuing from the tunnel,
the Court stated :

It is a well-recognized rule of law in this arid
region that where, as in the case at bar, a party
goes 11 JUHi a stream, the Witters of which haYe
been appropriated and put to a beneficial use
by others, and driz•cs a tunnel into the mountain
or water.i;hed drained by the stream, and immediately under or in
proximity to the
stream collects water which he claims to be developed water, he must make satisfactory
proof that such water is in fact "developed
water." In such case it is immaterial whether

!
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the water, when encountered, is flowing in
well-defined subterranean channels or is percolating through the soil, granl, and the fissures
and crevices of the rock. In either event, the
presumption is, until overcome by satisfactory
proof, that the water is tributary to the main
stream, and the right to its use is vested in the
prior appropriators of the stream.
149 P. at 934 (emphasis supplied).

In Bastian v. Ncbelter, 49 Utah 390, 163 P. 1092
(1917), the plaintiff was the owner of several wells,
all of which were near numerous springs and seeps.
Defendants' interests in the springs were prior to plaintiff's interests in the wells. The evidence clearly established, and both parties accepted, that the well water
an cl the flow from the springs and seeps came f rorn the
same source and were supplied by the identical underground reservoir. The temperature of the well water
was almost the same as that flowing from the springs,
and when the wells remained unplugged for a few days
some of the springs would go dry. During the course
of its opinion the Court set forth the following principle:
It is settled law in this jurisdiction that
where a party goes upon a stremn at or near its
source, the waters of which have been appropriated and are being used by others for beneficial purposes, and intercepts or taps a
subterranean flow or body of water and diverts
any substantial flow therefrom which he claims
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to be developed ·water, the hurden is upon him
to show by satisfactory proof that the water
so intercepted and diverted is "cleveloped
water." .Mountain Lake l\Iin. Co. v. Midway
Irr. Co., 149 Pac. 929. And where, as in the
case at bar, it is shown b!f indisputable evidence
that the water claimed to be developed water
is drawn f'rorn the same underground flow or
bodlf of' water that wholly or partially f ceds
and su pplics the sprin!(S from which the prior
appropriator ohtains his water, the subsequent
appropriator, the party claiming to have developed water, should be required to show by
clear, positive, and convincing evidence that the
water claimed by him is developed water.
l\Iountain I.,akc l\Iin. Co. v . .Midway Irr. Co.,
supra, and cases there cited.
163 P. at 109.5 (emphasis added).
The third case upon which the City's burden-of·
proof argument was principally grounded was Silver
King Con.'IOl. Jfi11ing Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah 297, 39
P .2d 682 ( 1934) . There, the mining company (the pre·
decessor in interest of United Park City l\lines) had
sued to quiet its title to the waters which had been en·
countered by the first 15,545 feet of the Spiro Tunnel.
The defendants in the case, water users in the Thaynes
Canyon and East Canyon drainage areas, claimed that
the tunnel waters involved were natura11y tributary to
the creeks flowing in those areas. The tunnel had been
driven into Thaynes Canyon and at the 10,500-foot
mark actually crossed under the bed of Thaynes Canyon
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Creek. The Comt ultimately held that the waters encountered in the first 6,600 feet of the tunnel were
naturally tributary to the Thaynes and East Canyon
drainage areas. In the course of the opinion the following observations were made:
It is also 'veil settled that, where one
claims he has developed water by means of tunnels or other underground works in close
pro,i;imity to the source of a stream or spring,
the waters of which have been previously appropriated by others, he is charged with the
burden of provir.g that his claimed development of water does not interfere with the
waters theretofore appropriated; that the
burden is on such person to show by satisfactory proof that the water so intercepted and to
he diverted is in fact "developed water" which
would not, hut for such interception, have
supplied the sources of such prior appropriators. l\Iountain Lake l\Iin. Co. v. Midway Irr.
Co., supra; Bastian v. Nebeker, 49 Utah, 390,
163 P. 1092; Midway Irr. Co. v. Snake Creek
lVI. & 'f. Co., supra, ancl Peterson v. Wood,
supra. The rule is stated in .Mountain Lake
1\1. Co. v. :Midway Irr. Co., supra, as follows:
[quoting the excerpt from lJI ountain Lake
case set forth above].
The rule arises from the presumption
stated. The decision must rest on evidence, not
the presumption. The office of the presumption is merely to give rise to the rule and cast
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the burden of proof. under such circumstances,
on the one claiming to have developed water.
In this case, therefore, the burden of proof is
on plaintiff not only because of its status as
plaintiff, and the allegations of its complaint,
hut also because of the rule which applies to
all persons claiming developed water under the
circumsfrmccs stated, whether they be parties
plaintiff or defendant. Plai11tiff does not deny,
hut concedes, that the burden of proof is on
it to establish that its claimed developed waters
are in fact developed waters, and that the interception and collection of such waters in its
mining tunnel has not diminished or depleted
the flow of the springs and sources from which
def end:ints have taken their water by virtue
of their prior appropriations.
39 P.2d at 686 (emphasis supplied).
The import of the foregoing and similar cases was
accurately and concisely stated in a recent law review
article. After discussing the case law \',rhich casts the
.burden of proof on tunnel owners, the author summed
up the underlying principle as follows:
In a sense the fore going rule would come
within the effect of the legal presumption. It
is generally considered, and it logically follows
that the umlerground waters beneath a surface
drainage contribute to the surface springs and
streams. Thus the fact of driving a tunnel or
shaft into or under a surface drainage (the
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basic fact) has probative value of the fact of
interference (the assumed fact) and the
burden of establishing the nonexistence of the
inference is upon the party against which the
presumption operates.

J. Novak, 1 1he Legal Dilemma In Dewatering
17 RocKY l\hN. l\1rn. L. lNsT. 657, 670 ( 1972) (foot-

notes omitted) .

By the same token, the principle may be described
by reference to the facts necessary to make out a prima
facie case. On the basis of Utah law the California
Supreme Court employed the concept of a prima facie
case in deciding a burden-of-proof issue which had
arisen on facts somewhat analogous to those present
here. In Larsen v. A pollonio, 5 Cal.2d 440, 55 P.2d 196
( 1936) , a prior stream user had sued to quiet his title
to the waters therein and to enjoin the defendant from
diYerting stream waters by means of a well. The stream
user prevailed at trial. On appeal, the defendant contended that the evidence produced at trial had been insufficient, for it failed to show that the well water had
its source in the stream. The Court responded as follows:
As to the water diverted by means of defendant's well and pump, the evidence shows
that the well is located about as feet from the
stream. and that the land underlying the bed
of the stream and extending on either side
thereof is of a loose, porous soil, that the water
level in the well corresponds with the bed of
the stream, and that the effect of pumping
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from the well is followe<l by a slight lessening
of the amount of waterllowing in the stream.
We must concede that the evidence on this
point is not as satisfactory as might be desired. It satisfied the trial court, and we cannot say that it was so lacking in evidentiary
value as not to support the court's conclusion.
The mere location of defendant's well in so
close proximity to the stream, with the other
attending circumstances, would seem to make
out a prima facie case in favor of plaintiffs
and cast upon defendant the burden of proving that his development of water had not
interfered with the waters in the stream. Silver
King Consol. l\Iining Co. v. Sutton (Utah)
39 P. (2d) 682.
55 P.2d at 197. In other words, from facts tending to
establish that a diversion is drawing water from a
stream, the Court was willing to presume that such was
the case.

The Pre-Trial Order entered herein reserved the
burden-of-proof issue for decision by the trial court.
( R. 58) . The reason for delaying decision on that issue
was understandable. In cases where the rule advocated
by the City had been employed, the factual basis for
its application was clear: either a tunnel had been driven
immediately adjacent to or beneath the stream in ques·
tion or springs supplying water to the creek had dried
up immediately after large flows were encountered in
the tunnel. Since facts of the type necessary to trigger
the presumption sought by Plaintiff had not been
established at the time of pre-trial, it would have been
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impossible to determine the burden-of-proof question
at that point. Consistent with the pre-trial judge's view
of the matter, the trial court did not decide who was
to bear what burden until all relevant evidence had been
received. ( U. 322) .
The evidence produced during the course of trial
may be categorized through the use of three general
classes:
1. Plow of Creek.
(i) Evidence produced by
Plaintiff intended to indicate a decrease in the flow
of Big Cottonwood Creek since the driving of the Spiro
Tunnel which was unnatural, i.e., not explainable by
natural causes. (ii) Evidence produced by Defendant
tending lo show that, since the driving of the Spiro,
Big Cottonwood Creek had behaved as was to be expected in view of the various changes and transitions,
other than the creation of the tunnel, which had occurred
over the same period.
2. Geology. ( i) Evidence produced by Plaintiff
intended to show that the physical attributes of Big Cottonwood Canyon and of the area in which the Spiro
is located are such as to facilitate the conveyance to the
Spiro of water which otherwise would be tributary to
Big Cottonwood Creek. (ii) Evidence produced by
Defendant tending to show that Big Cottonwood Canyon and the Spiro area are not geologically linked in
such a way as to facilitate such transfer of ground
water.
3. Origin of Spiro Waters. (i) Evidence produced by Plaintiff intended to show that Big Cottonwood waters are in fact those which emanate from the
Spiro. (ii) Evidence produced by Defendant tending
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to show that Spiro waters in fact would not, absent the
tunnel, contribute to Uig Cottonwood flow.
To a certain extent, evidence principally directed
to one question may also have a hearing on the questions with which the other two classes are directly concerned. For example, e\'i<lence tending to establish that
the Spiro and Big Cottonwood Canyon are not geologically linked so as to facilitate the conveyance of
water also tends to establish that, since the driving of
the Spiro, Big Cottomrnocl Creek has beha,·ed as would
be expected had the Spiro ne\'er been constructed. By
the same token, evidence tending to establish that Big
Cottonwood has behaved naturally since the driving of
the tunnel also tends to establish that the Spiro waters
do not have their source in some resen•oir which otherwise would feed the creek.
'Vith completion of the trial, the District Court
was required to determine whether the facts developed
therein established a basis for applying the hurden-ofproof rule a<lvocatcd hy the City. The court concluded
that the developed facts made this lawsuit quite cliff erent from the cases cited hy the City in support of
its burden-of-proof argument:
(I) The Spiro Tunnel was not driven in Big Cottonwood Canyon. Nor was it driven into and beneath
the surface of the Big Cottonwood drainage area. The
tunnel is not under or in close proximity to Big Cottonwood Creek. Rather, its portal is located several miles
away from the head or bed of the stream and the tunnel underlies a watershed which is situated over a
mountain from the Big Cottonwood drainage area.

( R. 264-65, 440) .
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( 2) There is no direct evidence that the driving
of the Spiro dried up or reduced the flow of any spring,
seep, or creek in Big Cottonwood Canyon. (R. 440-42,

Tr. 3582).

( 3) The five miles of underground workings
comprising the Spiro Tunnel are in the near vicinity
of and adjacent to approximately 1,000 miles of other
tunnels and mines. l\luch of those workings predates
the Spiro by many years. (R. 440).
Given this state of facts, it is apparent that the
cases relied upon by the City in support of its burdenof-proof contention were inapplicable. Accordingly,
the trial court should have cast on the City the burden
of proving all elements of the claim it had made, i.e.,
that the Spiro Tunnel is intercepting waters which are
tributary to Big Cottonwood Creek. The court did not
do so. Instead, it formulated another, a substitute, means
through which the City might create a presumption
that the Spiro is diverting Big Cottonwood waters. The
District Court thus held that the City had the burden
of proving that Big Cottonwood Creek had undergone
an unnatural decrease in flow which was coincident in
time with the driving of the Spiro Tunnel. If the City
had carried its own burden, the burden might then have
shifted to Defendant to prove that Spiro waters are
not tributary to Big Cottonwood. (R. 265).
It is clear that the burden-of-proof rule adopted
by the trial court was incorrect in that it provided the
City with an advantage to which it was not entitled
under the developed facts. The City was the plaintiff in
this case. The Spiro Tunnel was not driven into or
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beneath Big Cottonwood Canyon. The tunnel's portal
is far from any part of Big Cottonwocl Creek. Over
1,000 miles of workings, many of whieh intercepted and
are draining water, exist in the vicinity of the Spiro
Tunnel. The tunnel comprises but a small fraction of
those workings. The facts present in this case thus
provide absolutely no logical basis for a presumption
that the Spiro is tapping l3ig Cottonwood waters. Consequently, the trial court should have applied the usual
burden-of-proof standard under which the City, as
plaintiff, was required to prove all clements of the claim
it had made, not merely that an unnatural decrease in
Big Cottom..,oocl flow had occurred.
The City, however, did not succeed in carrying
even the minimal burden imposed on it. Consequently,
since in the end the trial court's error did not prejudice
Defendant, we shall assume: ( i) that the burden-ofproof rule formulated and applied below was co1Tect;
and (ii) that, if the City had proved that an unnatural
decrease in creek flow had taken place since the driving
of the Spiro, it might then have been fair to assume
initially that the Spiro was the cause and to have cast
upon Defenclant tte burden of proving that the tunnel
waters are not being clrawn from a source which other·
wise would feed Big Cottonwood.
In determining whether the City had carried the
burden of showing an unnatural decrease in creek flow,
the trial court consiclered all of the evidence which had
been presented. (R. 275). The court found that the City
had not sustained its burden. ( R. 471) . Set forth under
Point II below is a discussion of the evidence support·
ing that conclusion.
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The City in its Appellant''> Brief appears to be
somehow displeased with the way in which the trial court
dealt with the burden-of-proof question. On one hand,
the City concedes that the court properly placed on it
the burden of proving an unnatural decrease in the flow
of Big Cottonwood Creek since the driving of the Spiro
Tunnel. (Appellant's Brief, pages 39-41). On the
other, the City intimates that such burden should merely have been one of producing evidence, and not one
of persuasion. (Id., page 52). That contention lacks
support in both law and logic.
The requirement that the City establish an unnatural decrease in Big Cottonwood Creek was merely
a substitute for the necessity of its showing the basic
facts ordinarily present in a tuunel owner-stream user
controversy (i.e., a tunnel's proximity to the stream in
question, the drying up of springs tributary to the
stream, etc.). Consequently, if the usual stream user
bears the burden of persuasion with respect to such
basic facts, the City must do likewise in its attempt to
establish an unnatural decrease in Big Cottonwood.
An example will reveal which type of burden, that of
producing evidence or that of persuasion, is placed on
the stream user in the ordinary case.
In a typical case, at the outset of trial the stream
user, as plaintiff, might introduce evidence to the effect
that: (a) the defendant's tunnel was driven IO feet
from the stream bed; and ( b) when the tunnel encountered water, five springs dried up which theretofore had contributed to the flow of the stream. In the
usual case, these facts probably aren't even disputed.
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Accordingly, the tunnel mv11er ordinarily attempts to
overcome the presumption that the tunnel is diverting
water which otherwise would reach the stream. The tunnel owner, however, is not precluded from introducing
evidence which tends to negate the facts upon which that
presumption is based. Under appropriate circumstances
he might choose to attack the basic facts which the plaintiff has sought to establish. In so doing, the tunnel
owner might introduce evidence to the effect that:
(a) his tunnel in fact is 50 miles from the stream in
question; and (b) when water was encountered in the
tunnel, no springs tributary to the stream even dimin·
ishecl in flow. If the tunnel owner's evidence sufficiently diminishes the trier-of-fact's faith in the evidence
initially introduced by the stream user, the court will
find for the def e11da11t. The basis for the result would be
that the plaintiff had failed to carry its burden of per·
.rnasion with respect to the basic facts necessary to
create a presumption that the tunnel was diverting
water from the stream. If the burden resting on the
stream user were merely one nf producing evidence,
the foregoing result could not come about, for clearly
the stream user had produced evidence which, viewed
alone, tended to establish the facts giving rise to the
presumption. Compare Rule I ( 4) ("Burden of proof")
with Rule I (5) ("Burden of producing evidence"),
UTAH RULES m· EvrnEXCE.
The case of J\.artchncr v. JI orne, I Utah2d 112,
262 P .2d 7 49 ( 1953) , is instructive with respect to the
relationship between the burden of persuasion and the
burden of producing evidence. In that case the plain·
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tiffs-appellants contended that since certain corporate
stock they had received was part of an over-issue, the
transaction should be rescinded. During the course of
its opinion the Court supplied the following burden-ofproof analysis:
Appellants argue that their case was
prima facie made out by the mere showing that
all authorized stock had been issued and that
then the burden of proof shifted to respondents to show that some of the stock was afterward surrendered to provide for a valid
reissue. 5 Thompson on Corporations § 3557.
As explained in 5 "\Vigmore on Evidence
§ 2483 ff., burden of proof is used in two significances: first, as the risk of non-persuasion,
and second, as the duty of producing evidence.
The party having the risk of non-persuasion is
naturally the one upon whom first falls this
duty of going forward with evidence. Upon
meeting their duty of going forward with evidence that all authorized stock had been issued
before the issuance of plaintiffs' stock certificate, plaintiffs made out a prima facie case.
Thereupon, the burden, in the second meaning
of the phrase, shifted to the defendants, but
the risk of non-persuasion, which never shifts,
remained with plaintiffs. "\Vigmore § 2489.
Defendants produced evidence (namely, that
the Sorensen stock was with cancelled stock
of the corporation at the time of trial and Sorensen's testimony that his stock was surrendered for the purpose of the reissue and that

24

there had been no subsequent reissues) to meet
the duty of going forward. Thus, the shifting
burden again devolved upon plaintiff's to produce evidence that the stock was not surrendered, that is, endorsed and delivered, before
the reissue of that stock. There is a presumption that official duties are regularly performed and that proceedings are regular,
'Vigmore § 2534. which has been applied in
this jurisdiction to official acts of a corporation and its directors. Singer v. Salt Lake City
Copper l\Ianufacturing Co., 17 Utah 143, .53
P. 1024. Thus, in absence of evidence to the
contrary, the corporation is presumed to have
the stock for reissue at some time before reissuing it. Plaintiffs did not offer evidence to rebut this presumption; hence, the
finding of the trial court that the surrender
took place before the reissuance will be upheld.
262 P.2d at 751-52. St:e also Fretz v. Anderson, 5
Utah2d 290, 300 P.2d 642, 649-50 (1956}.
The stream user-tunnel owner example employed
above is admittedly somewhat extreme, but it typifies
what occurred in this case. The City was unable to
establish that the Spiro Tunnel had been driven in close
proximity to Big Cottonwood Creek or that any partic·
ular spring, seep, or other tributary to the creek had
diminished in flow when the tunnel encountered water.
It thus lacked the basic facts usually necessary to create
a presumption and thereby to trigger a shift of the
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burden of proof to Defendant. A substitute for the
usual basic facts was made available to and was accepted
by the City and, if it had been able to prove an unnatural decrease in Big Cottonwood since the driving
of the Spiro, the burden might have shifted to Defendant. Rather than merely accepting the "unnatural
decrease" evidence produced by the City, however, Defendant chose to dispute it. After considering all evidence bearing on the question, the trial court found
that the City had not met its burden of persuasion. Accordingly, the trial court entered Judgment in favor of
Defendant.
The foregoing discussion should make clear that
as formulated and applied the burden-of-proof rule
adopted by the District Court could not have been more
advantageous to the City. Any error connected with the
burden-of-proof issue operated in favor of the City and
to the detriment of Defendant. Defendant urges this
Court to so hold.
POINT II. THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT THE CITY
FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE HAS BEEN
AN UNNATURAL DECREASE IN THE FLOW
OF BIG COTTONWOOD CREEK SINCE THE
DRIVING OF THE SPIRO TUNNEL.

The crucial ultimate Finding of :Fact entered by
the District Court was as follows: "Upon a careful consideration and weighing of all the evidence introduced
in this case, including that hereinbefore evaluated, the
Court finds that plaintiff Salt Lake City has failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there
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has been an unnatural decrease in the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek since the d1;iVlng of the Spiro Tunnel."
( R. 471). This finding is dispositive of the case for
two reasons: ( l) As was established under Point I,
supra, for the City to make out a prima facie case it
must carry its burden of proving an unnatural decrease
in flow of Big Cottonwood since the driving of the
tunnel. Since the City did not sustain that burden, it
never even established a prima facie case. (2) If Big
Cottonwood has undergone no unnatural decrease since
the driving of the Spiro, the Creek cannot very well
be losing water to the tunnel. Accordingly, if the finding is upheld by this Court, the Judgment below should
be affirmed.
This Court has repeatedly held that "even in equity
cases we will not interfere with the findings of the trial
court unless it manifestly appears that the court has
misapplied proven facts or made findings clearly
against the weight of the evidence." 1-Vatlcins v. Strong,
26 Utah2d 407, 490 P.2d 888, 889 ( 1971) ; Kartchner
v. llorne, l Utah2d 112, 202 P.2d 749, 751 (1958). In
fact, this Court applied that principle when the first
case involving the waters of the Spiro Tunnel was con·
sidered by it:
The court made findings in fuvor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant on the
issues raised by the counterclaim of W. D.
Sutton. "\\rithout elaborating on the evidence
we find it sharply divided with respect to these
issues, but there is ample evidence in the record
to support the findings of the trial court, and
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we are unable to say that the evidence preponderates against such findings and therefore decline to interfere with them.

Silver /(ling Consol.

Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah 297,

39 p .2d 682, 694-95 ( 1934).

Even in the typical case on appeal, giving deference to the trial court makes good sense. In this case,
it makes even better. The City comenced this action in
February of 1964, more than eight years ago. (R. 1-6).
Largely due to the technical complexity of the evidenciary matters involved and the consequent difficulties in preparation, trial of the case did not even
commence until January, 1967. (R. 316). Immediately prior to trial, with the cooperation of the parties the
District Court actually examined the Spiro Tunnel and
the watersheds involved in this action. ( R. 54) . Once
begun, the trial lasted three weeks. During the course
thereof the parties introduced into evidence 179 highly
technical exhibits and testimony filling over 2, 100 pages
of transcript. (R. 316-17). Only in July of 1968, almost
17 months after the trial's completion and after having
fully considered the evidence, did the District Court
enter its l\Iemorandum Decision (R. 152). The contents thereof make apparent that the lower court gave
the evidence in this case as thorough and as complete
an anlysis as could be expected of anyone. All features
of this proceeding give added support to this Court's
disinclination to disturb the findings of the court below.
None of the material produced by either party during the course of trial provides direct evidence either
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for or against the proposition that Big Cottonwood
Creek has undergone an unnatural decrease since the
driving of the Spiro. Rather, the probative value of the
various items of proof most often lies in inferences,
and often the inference to be drawn depends upon what
inferencial value has been ascribed to other evidenciary
matter. l\Ioreover, two pieces of evidence quite often
give rise to conflicting inferences. For these reasons,
and because of the technical complexity and mass of
the evidence, it is difficult to adequately summarize
here the evidence supporting the trial court's findings.
Nevertheless, such a summary follows. In its review
thereof, the Court should have in mind a well-worn
principle: On appeal, conflicting evidence or inferences
should be viewed in the light most favorable to the trial
court's findings and determinations. I-Jarmon v. Rasrnusscn, 13 Utah2d 422, 375 P.2d 762, 765 ( 1962);
In re General Determination of TV ater /lights in Green
River Drainage Area, 12 Utah2d 102, 363 P.2d 199,
201 (1961).
In an attempt to prove its contention that Big Cottonwood Creek had undergone an unnatural decrease
since the driving of the Spiro, the City introduced in
evidence various stream flow records, comparisons between the historical flows of Big Cottonwood and the
flows of certain other streams, precipitation records,
records covering the water flows of the tunnel, miscellaneous computations and exhibits through which data
contained in the mentioned records was compared,
testimony relating to the geology of Big Cottonwood
and Thaynes Canyons, and opinion evidence concerning
the alleged relationship between the waters of the Spiro
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and of Big Cottonwood Creek. In its portion of the
case, Defendant adduced evidence negating the City's
inference that there had been an unnatural decrease in
Big Cottonwood since the driving of the tunnel. Much
of Defendant's evidence to this effect is described
below.
1. The City'., Double "ltlass Curves Were Not
Prepared In Accordance JVith Accepted Procedures.
In its attempt to demonstrate an unnatural decrease

in Big Cottonwood flow since the Spiro, the City introduced into evidence various graphs known as double
mass curves. A double mass curve is the line determined
by plotting, by year, the accumulated total discharge of
one stream (on one axis) versus the accumulated total
discharge of another stream or several streams (on the
other axis). The year in which accumulation of discharge begins is determined by the person preparing
the graph. If the line established by the plotted points
is perfectly straight, during the period covered by the
graph the proportionality between the total flow of the
single stream and the total flow of the other stream or
group of streams has remained exactly constant. If the
slope of the line changes, at the point of change the
proportionality of the flows being compared has
changed, and either the stream or group on the axis
toward which the slope trends has undergone a relative
increase or there has been a relative decrease in the flow
plotted on the other axis. The double mass curve alone
does not reveal which of these two possibilities is the
"real" one. (Tr. 813-19, 2852-53).
All of the City's double mass curves consisted of
plots of one stream against a single second stream,
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rather than against a base composed of several streams.
Defendant's evidence established that the use of .11evcral
streams as a base is the preferable and accepted technique: (a) a relative change in slope can then with some
degree of certainty be ascribed to the single subject
stream; and ( b) because a multi-stream base contains
the flows of several streams, any random errors which
are present in the measured flows of the constituent
streams will tend to cancel out one another-as a result,
the likelihood decreases that such random errors will be
reflected in the graph's slope line. (R. 379-80, Tr.
2967-70, 3337). The trial court found the City's singlestream approach suspect. (It. 4.52-53).
None of the City's double mass curves covered
years prior to 191G. (Tr. 1195-96). The Spiro waters
about which the City was complaining were encountered
between 1920 and Hl23, between 1927 and 1933, and in
1938. (R. 342). The slope line on the City's curves was
therefore extremely short
the time Spiro waters were
first encountered. A fairly long and well-established
slope line is necessary before much certainty is possible
regarding whether or not a change in slope has even
occurred. Hence, any conclusion is questionable which
relates to change in slope on the City's curves around
the time the Spiro first encounteted water.
Since perfect proportionality never exists between
flows spanning several years, the points plotted on a
double mass curve ne,·er form a perfectly straight line.
As a result, the slope line actually employed must be
the line which best represents a somewhat irregular
pattern of dots. In determining exactly where to place
a slope line on each of its graphs, the City used an
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"eyeball" or "straightedge" approach. In other words,
a City witness judgmentally determined how to fit the
various slope lines along and between the plotted points
they were intended to represent. The slope line's location is crucial, since it is that line which will determine
whether a "break" in the double mass has or has not
occurred. The "eyeba1l" approach is the crudest, least
accurate method of establishing the slope. The preferable and more exact method is through the use of
statistical procedures. (R. 468, Tr. 822-23, 841-42).
2. Deficiencies In The Water Records And
Measurement Programs For Big Cottonwood And
Comparison Streams Are 1_lhe Probable Causes Of Apparent Breaks In The Double lllass Curves. Defendant's witness Dr. Jay Bagley, Director of the Utah
Water Research Laboratory, testified that the difficulty encountered in stream flow programs is to determine
whether an indicated change in flow is "real" (an
actual variation in flow) or merely "apparent." An
apparent change may be due to a measuring error or
change which persists over a period of time. (Tr. 296775). The most common causes of such systematic errors
are changes in the type, location, or other physical
characteristics of the device being used to measure
stream flow. (Exhibit C, R. 376-78, Tr. 2995). Each
device is unique, has accuracy characteristics which are
peculiar to itself, and depends upon different methods
or computations to determine actual water flow. When
one measuring device is replaced by another, there
usually is a definite change in magnitude from readings
which were obtained with the orginal instrument. (Tr.
1679-80). Over a period of several years such syste-
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matic errors result in an accumulated difference between the flow recorded prior to the change and that
recorded after. The divergence wiU be reflected on a
double mass plot. (Tr. IG80, 2995). Defendant's evidence also established that if a change in the water
measurement program concerning either the subject
or the base stream occurred at the same time as an apparent break in the double mass curve, under accepted
practice such measurement change is considered a
reasonable explanation for the break. (R. 377, Tr.
2fH)5). In light of these considerations, Defendant
thought it worthwhile to examine historically the measurement programs relating to Big Cottonwood and the
streams against which the City had double massed that
creek. Among the measuring changes and recording
discrepancies revealed by the evidence and testimony
were the following:
a. Rig Cotton-wood at the IJI outh. Between
1908 and mm, flow at the mouth of Big Cottonwood
was measured by two 15-foot cippoletti weirs. In 1916
they were replaced by a 30-foot cippoletti weir. That
device was used until 19.53, when the City switched to
a combination of a 48-inch sparling meter, a six-foot
parshall flume, and a 14-foot flume. ( R. 297, Tr. 2707).
From 1914 through 1917 and in 1930 the flow records
were somehow adjusted to take account of discharge
from Lake Blanche. (R. 298, Tr. 2706). In part of
193.5 and 1936 storage in Lake Blanche was only estimated. (Tr. 2716). Records after 1949 contain no indication of how discharges from the lake were handled.
(Tr. 2716). Throughout the period of measurement,
no factor was taken into account for evaporation from
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Twin Lake Gulch, Lake Mary, Lake Martha, Lake
Phoebe, Dog Lake, and Lake Catherine, all of which
store Big Cottonwood water. (R. 324, Tr. 700-04,
1200). The City's field records covering 1918-1930
were never located. (R. 298). In 19.31, 2 cfs were
added to the measured flows to compensate for estimated leakage. (R. 299, Tr. 2707). Throughout the
entire measurement period very meagre records were
maintained for Jfotler Ditch, which diverts a small
amount of creek water about three-fourths of a mile
above the mouth. The flow into the ditch was added
only for a portion of 1912, possibly in 1939, and after
1957. (R. 175, 297-98, 452, Tr. 846, 881, 2705). In
1949 the hub (the point at which water depth is measured) on the HO-foot weir was found to be four hundredths of a foot too high and was adjusted accordingly.
(R. 298, Tr. 361.5). Dr. Bagley testified that a .04foot height discrepancy on that type of weir results
in an error of between 6.1 and 7.7 cfs. (Tr. 3055).
b. Big Cottonwood at Argenta. Between 1916
and 1927 those measurements which were taken at
Argenta were accomplished with periodic current meter
readings at a cleaned-out section of creek bed. ( R. 299).
Such readings tend not to be accurate, as they are highly
dependent upon the operator's judgment and cannot
be taken during times of high water. (Tr. 2861-62).
In 1927 the old device was replaced with a rating section. (IL 299, Tr. 710). In 1928 an automatic recording instrument was installed. (R. 299, Tr. 2709). During the winter months it was often inoperative due to
icing. (Tr. 713). In 1962 the device then being used
was replaced with a 12-foot parshall flume located
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immediately south of the old site. (ll. 299, Tr. 2714).
As was the case with measurements at the mouth, readings have not taken account of evaporation from upstream reservoirs. (Tr. 700-04, 1200). In 1938 water
was being stored in Lake l\Iary and Twin Lakes, but
no measurements were made of the volume impounded.
( ll. 301, Tr. 2712). During portions of 1945, 1946,
and 1947 no actual records were kept and the flow at
Argenta was estimated only. (Tr. 2713). Between
1916 and 1928 no actual readings whatsoever were
made during the "winter months" (October through
l\Iarch) . Argenta flows for this portion of the year
were the result of estimates. (R. 299-301, Tr. 792, 89.5,
1131, 2864). The same was true for 1959 and all years
thereafter. ( R. 300, Tr. 2714). The estimated flows
vary widely. (Tr. 2714). Because of the above-noted
deficiencies, the U.S. Geological Survey has refused
to publish the Argenta records as legitimate stream·
flow data. (Tr. 28ti3). The District Court concluded
that such deficiencies had a substantial bearing on the
weight to be given evidence based on the Argenta read·
ings. (R. 455).
c. Comparison of Flows at the
and at
Argenta. To graphically illustrate how the measure·
ment and recording deficiencies outlined above have
detracted from the significance of compiled Big Cot·
tonwood flow data, Defendant introduced its Exhibit
000. That exhibit eontains four double mass curves
which plot against one another the records compiled at
Argenta, the mouth, and the Stairs (the three Big
Cottonwood measurement sites). Defendant's expert
Dr. Jay Bagley testified that if a change in flow re·
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corded at an upstream station is a real one, it will be
reflected at the downstream station and will cause no
break in a double mass plot between readings taken at
the two sites. If the recorded change is not the result
of an actual alteration in flow, but rather is caused by
some recording or measurement discrepancy, a break
will occur in the double mass curve. ( R. 398).
Meaningful breaks in double mass curves are not
always apparent to the eye, and apparent breaks are
not always meaningful. Accordingly, in Exhibit 000,
as with all of its double mass plots, Defendant utilized
a statistical procedure to determine when meaningful
breaks occurred (whether or not apparent to the eye) and
the significance, in terms of probability, of each such
break. Through this procedure Defendant's witnesses
were able to state the level of statistical confidence associated with each break. A significance level of 95%
is ordinarily regarded as high enough to justify the
conclusion that the break to which it relates is the result
of more than a random occurrence. (R. 380-81).
The four double mass curves contained on Exhibit
000 reveal that during the years noted below breaks occurred, and that each of those breaks has a significance
of at least 95 % :
Argenta vs. Stairs, winter flow (October
through March) : 1921, 1948
Mouth vs. Stairs, winter flow: 1924, 1933,
1934, 1935, 1941, 1944, 1949, 1957

Argenta vs. Mouth, winter flow: 1935, 1949,
1953
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Argenta vs. .Mouth, water year (October
through September): 1924, 1935, 1940,
l949, 19;33, 195()
(R. 398). The exhibit thus estab]ishes that the apparent
alterations in the flow of Big Cottonwood during the
noted years were not real, but resulted from mere recording or measurement changes or errors. By double
massing Big Cottonwood flow data against that for
other streams, the City had attempted to establish
changes in Big Cottonwood flow occurring around or
shortly after the years 1920-1923 (Spiro being driven
through wet zone of the Park City Formation), 19271933 ( 143 Drift driven), 1938 ( Thaynes Shaft constructed) , and 1949 (pumping ceased in West End
Shaft). Exhibit 000 and the history of Big Cottonwood's measurement program at the very least create
extreme doubt as to whether the relative changes in flow
relied upon by the City even occurred.
In its series of double mass curves the City employed Little Cottonwood, Parley's, Mill, and City
Creeks as standards against which to compare Big Cottonwood. As is mentioned above, from a double mass
plot alone, particularly one using only a single stream
as a base, one cannot determine whether the cause of a
shift in slope is a change in the subject stream or in the
stream being used as a base. Consequently, it is important to examine the gauging histories of the four
streams the City employed as comparisons.
d. Little Cottonwood Creek. Between 1914 and
1924 Little Cottonwood water was being measured over
two 15-foot weirs. In the latter year they were replaced
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by a concrete flume rating station two and one-half
miles a,..,·ay from the earlier site. Substantial channel
losses occurred between the two locations. (R. 302-04,
384, 'fr. 725, 1122, 2718). Beginning in 1930 total
flow was determined by adding measurements taken
at the rating station, a power plant tailrace, and Beaver
Pond Springs. ( R. 302, Tr. 728-29, 734). Since 1949,
when a 15-foot parshall flume was installed, total flow
has been obtained by adding records from the flume,
a weir on a City conduit, diversions to Farmer's conduit, Beaver Pond Springs, and the 'Vest Side Water
Company Conduit. (R. 302, Tr. 726, 735, 3038). Flows
for 1916 and 1917 were estimated in 1964 by John
Ward, a City witness. (R. 302, Tr. 738-39). U.S.G.S.
flow records for the years 1917-1920 show between five
and six thousand acre-feet per year less than the
amounts revealed by the City records which were employed in its double mass curves. The years 1916-1920
were crucial in establishing slope lines. (Tr. 1106-07,
121.5). City field records could not be located for the
period between 1918 and 1926. (R. 302, Tr. 725-26).
In 1926 the rating station had debris in its channel.
(R. 302, Tr. 2719). In 1928 the City switched to a new
rating curve for use in computing discharge from an
existing measuring device. ( R. 302, Tr. 2719) . In 1933
and 1934 there was a break and a leak in the power
plant tailrace. 0.6 cfs was added to recorded flow as
an adjustment. ( R. 302, Tr. 2720, 3038). In 1937 the
rating station was in poor condition and during the next
three years power plant flow was only estimated. (R.
302, Tr. 2720). No adjustment for lake storage was
made in 1942. (R. 302). Between 1947 and 1949, 0.5
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cfs was a<l<led to recorded flows to compensate for leakage. (R. 302, Tr. 2721, 3038). Throughout the entire
period of measurement, flows from the \Vasatch Drain
Tunnel were included in the Little Cottonwood totals.
Although the portal of that tunnel is in Little Cottonwood Canyon, it is driven toward Big Cottonwood and
nothing established that the waters intercepted thereby
did not have their source in Big Cottonwood rather
than Little Cottonwood Canyon. (Tr. 826-27, 2799).
e. IJlill Creek. Between 1914 and 1928 the total
flow of Mill Creek was measured over a IO-foot rectangular weir. (R. 305, Tr. 741, 2703). In 1928 a lower
rating station was added to measure the power plant
tailrace flow. Between 1949 and 1951 total flow was
measured through a rating station located two-tenths
of a mile upstream from the previous location. (R. 305,
Tr. 741-42, 2703-04). The Boundary Spring pipeline
diversion began in 1951. Flow through the line was
measured by a sparling meter and was added to the
rating station records. (R. 305, Tr. 743, 2704). Due
to missing records, part of the flows for HH5 and 1916
were estimated by the City's witness John \Var.d.
(Tr. 747). Until 1924, high water was bypassed and
only estimated. (R. 305, Tr. 2703). In 1926 the weir
was found to be defective and 0.5 cf s was added as an
adjustment. During 1927 and 1928, 20% and 10%, re·
spectively, of measured flow was added as an adjustment. No explanation for the differences in adjust·
ment was provided. (R. 305, Tr. 2703).

f. Parley's Crcelc. Beginning in 1907, flow was
measured over two IO-foot cippoletti weirs just above
Suicide Rock Reservoir. (R. 307, Tr. 749). In 1917
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Mountain Dell Reservoir was constructed and adjustments were begun for storage and release. (Tr. 754).
In 1929, 20 % of total flow was added to the recorded
measurements as an estimate for high water. (R. 307,
Tr. 1699). Commencing in 1932 records were obtained
by use of a rating station upstream, immediately above
Stillman Bridge. (R. 307, Tr. 752, 2700). For a period
in 1934 stream flow was only estimated. (Tr. 2700).
The Highline Pipe diversion was commenced in 1934.
It was measured by means of a 5-foot cippoletti weir.
(R. 307, Tr. 752). That weir was found to be .17 foot
too high in 1938. ( ll. 307, Tr. 2701). It was replaced
in 1944 with a IO-foot cippoletti. (R. 307). In 1947
flow was estimated due to icing. (Tr. 2701). Field
records for 1948 through 1955 could not be located.
(Tr. 2701). In 1956 the Highline diversion point was
switched upstream to Mountain Dell Reservoir. (R. 307,
Tr. 753). In 1957 a 7*-foot cippoletti weir replaced
the rating station during periods of low flow. (R. 307,
Tr. 2701).
g. Cit,IJ Creek. l\Iethods of measuring City Creek
water have been more complex, and have changed more
often, than procedures on the streams already noted.
Throughout its history the creek's total flow has been
measured by combining the records of numerous devices, most of which exist to determine the amount of
water diverted into several City lines. (R. 310-11, Tr.
610-25, 1117-19, 1687-92). Dr. Bagley's opinion was
that, because of the number and the severity of changes
which the City Creek program had undergone, its
ostensible "single'' historical record was in fact seven
records, none of which were consistent with each other.
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(Tr. 3072). Defendant's witness Milton \\Tilson voiced
a similar opinion. Under the U.S.G.S. program for
publishing stream flows, the records for City Creek, if
published at all, would have been segmented and not
treated as a single, internally consistent record. (Tr.
2841, 2939).
Double mass curves utilizing the above streams
were the principal tools employed by the City in its
attempt to demonstrate an unnatural loss in Big Cottonwood since the driving of the Spiro. Virtually all
breaks in the City's curves coincided with the dates of
measuring device changes or measurement problems
connected with one of the two streams being double
massed. It is understandable why the District Court
facts into account in its consideration of the
took
City's double mass data. (R. 376-79, 468).

a. The Comparison Streams Used B.lf The City
In Its Double 11/ass Curves JV ere Inadequate. Since
a double mass plot cannot alone ascribe to a break
changes in a particular stream, meaningful use can be
made of such curves only if the stream or streams comprising the base are carefully selecte<l for stability and
long-term consistency. The City failed to select its
comparison streams with this principle in mind. As a
result, C\'en if the foregoing measurement problems
were ignored, it is most questionable whether any
meaningful conclusion could be drawn from the City's
double mass data.
The bulk of the inferences the City attempted to
draw from its double mass plots were based upon com·
parisons between Big and Little Cottonwood Creeks.

41

Even John Ward, the City's own witness, admitted that
Big Cottonwood and Little Cottonwood are not similar
canyons. ( R. 369, Tr. 1204). Defendant's witness Dr.
Bagley noted that Big and Little Cottonwood Creeks
are hydrologically substantially different, probably because of differences in the mantle and geological conditions associated with each. (Tr. 3335). Dr. Bagley
consiclered Little Cottonwood to be a "bad actor," and
noted that changes from period to period in Little Cottonwood are far greater than alterations in other
streams. (Tr. 3072). Defendant's expert Milton Wilson
concluded that Little Cottonwood was unreliable for the
entire period covered by its records. (Tr. 2838, 2852).
Moreover, all flows of Little Cottonwood have included
waters emanating from the \'Vasatch Drain Tunnel.
That tunnel is connected with the Cardiff Mines in the
Big Cottonwood drainage area; as a result, Little Cottonwood may contain what are actually Big Cottonwood
waters. (R. 294, Tr. 826-27, 2799). For each of Big
Cottonwood at the mouth, Argenta, Little Cottonwood,
Mill, Parley's, and City Creeks, Dr. Bagley derived a
statistical measure known as the coefficient of variation.
Such coefficients indicate that of the named streams
Big Cottonwood at the mouth is the least variable from
year to year, Little Cottonwood is the most erratic in
its patterns, and City Creek is the next most erractic.
(Tr. 3060-61).
Consistency and thoroughness in a series of singlestream comparisons, as were the City's, require that
each stream utilized be double massed against the others.
As noted by the District Court, Plaintiff failed to offer
any double mass curves comparing the water year
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flows of Parley's Crc;ek with either l\Iill or City Creek,
or comparing the winter flows of Parley's with Little
Cottonwood, l\I ill, or City Creek. ( R. 454). The City
also neglected to introduce any curves plotting Argenta
flow against Parley's Creek. (R. 456). And the City's
double mass program did not include Emigration Creek
flows at all. ( ll. 454).
4. The City's Curves Are Inconsistent Among
7 1hc11u1elvcs And JJTith Other Flow Data. Further
doubt is cast upon the City's double mass curves when
they are compared with one another and with other
stream flow data. The District Court noted the follow·
ing discrepancies: (a) The City Creek-Little Cotton·
wood double mass curve (Exhibit P-28) shows no di·
vergence toward either axis and the City Creek-Mill
Creek curve (Exhibit P-38) shows only a slight diver·
gence, apparently indicating the consistency of those
three streams with respect to one another. The Little
Cottonwood-1\IilJ Creek curve (Exhibit P-26), how·
ever, shows a substantial divergence beginning in 1927.
( R. 27!:>, 453). ( b) Because of the manner in which
double mass curves are prepared, see supra, the first
point on the plot is the origin and the initial slope line
should pass through the origin. The beginning slope
line for City Creek-1\Iill Creek, winter flow (Exhibit
P-39) does not pass through the origin, thereby cast·
ing doubt on the location of that line. (R. 453).
( c) The City Creek-Little Cottonwood winter flow
curve (Exhibit P-30) reveals no divergence, indicating
that any changes in either stream are tracked by cor·
responding changes in the other. When the two streams
are double massed against Big Cottonwood (Exhibits
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P-25, P-43) approximately the same total divergence-

between 60,000 and 62,000 acre feet-is shown for a
20-year period. However, the water flow records for
Little Cottonwood and City Creek reveal that Little
Cottonwood runoff is about twice that of City Creek
for the same period. ( R. 453) . ( d) The significance
of the Big Cottonwood-Parley's Creek winter flow
curve (Exhibit P-42) is questionable due to the fact
that the curve from HH6 to 1935 is such that a slight
difference in judgment regarding positioning of the
initial slope line can materially alter the extent of divergence from that shown. (R. 454). Moreover, Exhibit P-23 shows that for the water year any changes
have been conbetween Big Cottonwood and
sistent. (R. 453). ( e) The curve for Mill Creek-Big
Cottonwood, winter flow (Exhibit P-41) suggests that
between 1929 and 1950 :Mill Creek gained, in comparison to Ilig Cottonwood, 3.52 cfs. However, the water
flow recor<ls for the winter months reveal that over the
same period there was a greater percentage loss in Mill
Creek than in Ilig Cottonwood. (R. 454). (f) The
City's hydrographs on Exhibit 15 compare only Big
Cottonwood, I,ittle Cottonwood, and City Creeks.
Hydrographs for Mill Creek and Parley's are not
shown. The hydrographs for City and I1ig Cottonwood
Creeks more closely parallel one another in the peaks
and valleys than do those covering Little Cottonwood
and City. It seems strange, therefore, that the City's
double mass curve comparing City Creek and Little
Cottonwood showed no divergence while that between
City Creek and Big Cottonwood did. (R. 457).
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5. Defendant's Double 11Iass Curves Reflect The
Use Of Accepted
And Produce Different
1
1
Resnlts 'l. han 1 hc CiflJ's. All of Defendant's double
mass curves were prepared through the use of a computer, thereby eliminating the judgmental elements '
and unconscious bias which inevitably creep into a human work product. Positioning the various slope lines
by the use of a computer did away with the drawbacks
of the "eyeball" or "straightedge" approach preferred
by the City and resulted in far greater accuracy. (R.
379, 468, Tr. 1605, 1623, 2991). In addition, Defendant
employed a statistical procedure ( discussecl under sec·
ti on 2 ( c) , supra) to locate and determine the significance of breaks appearing on its double mass plots. '
(R. 380-81).

1

So as to eliminate the drawbacks of single-stream
comparisons, Defendant's curves utilized multi-station ,
bases. Defendant's experts established that the use of
multi-stream bases is the accepted and prefer able prac·
tice, since random variations in the streams comprising
the base tend to offset one another, and because any
change in slope of the curve can more readily he
ascribed to the subject stream. (R. 379-80, Tr. 2984).
The three bases utilized by Defendant were as follows:
a. Four Station Base: Comprised of City Creek,
Parley's Creek, l\Iill Creek, and Big Cottonwood.
Covers the period 1!)00-19G5. (R. 381). This particular
combination was used because the four named streams
are the only ones having flow records extending as far
back as 1900 and because they generally are influenced
by the same hydrological and climatic conditions. (Tr.
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2079, 2983). Since records for this base began in 1900,
the curves employing it could be analyzed with the aid
of an initial slope line running for many years prior
to the Spiro's existence.
b. TJTasatch B'ront Base: Comprised of the four
station base streams plus Little Cottonwood and Emigration Creek. Covers the period 1913-1965. This combination results in a base composed of all 'Vasatch
Front streams. (R. 381-82).
c. Eight Station Base: Comprised of M:ill Creek,
Parley's Creek, Emigration Creek, Little Cottonwood,
City Creek, 'V eher River at Oakley, Logan River, and
Blacksmith's Fork Creek. This base was "normalized"
by a computer. That is, the stream flow as recorded
was divide<l into the mean flow for the period of record,
thus giving each of the eight stations equal weight.
(R. 382). The base was compiled so as to increase the
number of constituent streams, since, as established by
Defendant's expert Dr. Bagley, by maximizing the
number of stations one minimizes the chance that the
base contains inconsistencies. ( R. 385). The eight
streams used have reasonably long records and the
Weber River, Logan River, and Blacksmith's Fork
Creek, although some distance from Big Cottonwood,
have a fairly good correlation with the 'Vasatch Front
streams. (Tr. 3144, 3332).
Defendant introduced into evidence 42 double mass
curves through which the winter and water year flows
of seven stations (City Creek, Emigration Creek, Parley's Creek, Mill Creek, Little Cottonwood Creek, Big
Cottonwood at the mouth, and Argenta) were separate-
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ly plotted against each oi__!he_ bases described above.
The curves reveal that, with respect to each of those
stations, during each of the years noted below there
were breaks having a significance level of at least 95%
(R. 386-96):

City Creek:

1908, 1914, 1923, 1924, 1932,
1948,
1954, 1959, 1960

Emit;ration Creek:

1918, 1919, 1923, 1930,
1935, 1947, 1948, 1952

ParleJJ's Creek:

1923, 1930,
1952, 1953,

1935, 1939,
1958

lJlill Creek:

1916, 1917, 1926, 1928, 1929,
1934, 193;3, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1949, 1953,
1959

Little Cottonwood:

1924, 1930, 1932, 1934,
1937, 1941, 1942, 1945, 1948, 1952. 1959

Big Cottonwood at the JJlouth:

1920, 1928,
1933, 1935, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1944, 1947,
1948, HlMl, 1953, 1954, 1956, 1958, 1959

Argenta:

1920, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1931, 1933,
1934, 1936, 1937, 1940, 1941, 1945, 1946,
1950, 1951, 1953, 1956

Note that the double mass curves for all of the
above streams, not just the plots relating to Big Cotton·
wood, revealed numerous breaks throughout the various
stream flow histories. Dr. Bagley testified that almost
all of the breaks were due to certain of the record-keep·
ing changes or deficiencies outlined in section 2 above
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(R. 38G-96, Tr. 2998-3052, 3070, 3171), although he
indicated that Big Cottonwood may have undergone a
change between 1928 and 1935. (R. 397). The District
Court concluded that Defendant's double mass curves
tend to off set the City's evidence. (R. 4G8).

The opinion of Defendant's expert witness Milton
Wilson was that, with but one exception, the flow of
Big Cottonwood has not diminished with respect to
streams whose discharge has been collected at the same
location and under the same conditions throughout its
history. The exception related to Little Cottonwood,
and was based on the possibility that the Wasatch Drain
Tunnel may be augmenting that creek's flow at the
expense of Uig Cottonwood. (Tr. 2868-69).
To the same effcct was Defendant's Exhibit Y. It
consisted of six hydrographs depicting the water year
flows of Logan River, 'i\T eber River, Uig Cottonwood,
Mill Creek, Parley's Creek, and Emigration Creek.
Each graph was broken into three 18-year periods
(HlOG-1923, 1924-1941, 1942-1959) so as to compare
average flows. The average for each stream was highest <luring the first period. The average of each was
lowest for the second period, 1924-1941. During those
years the streams which underwent the least decline
were the Logan and 'V eber Rivers, each of which discharged 34% less water than during the first period.
l\Iill, Parley's, and Emigration Creeks decreased from
between 39% and 42%. Big Cottonwood suffered only
a 35% drop. During· the third period, 1942-1959, the
average flow of each of the six streams was either 25 %
or 26% less than the flow during the first period. (R.
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401). The trial court observed that this information

suggests that Big Cotton\vocm ·has not undergone a
decline noticeably different from that suffered by the
other five streams. (IL 468).
The data and testimony summarized above would,
even standing alone, appear to provide more than ample
support for the lower court's conclusion that the City
failed to establish an unnatural decrease in Big Cottonwood since the driving of the Spiro. However, Defendant introduced additional evidence which totally
eliminated the credibility of the City's assertions.
6. Ths City's Evidence Concerning Precipitation
And Hunof f Is IJiisleading. In its attempt to establish
an unnatural decrease in Big Cottonwod flow, the City
introduced various evidence relating to precipitation
which falls in Thaynes, Big Cottonwood, and Little
Cottonwood Canyons and the runoff which flows from
those areas. On its face, the City's evidence may have
tended to indicate that Big Cottonwood runoff is less
than it theoretically should be. Evidence introduced by
Defendant severely detracted from the methods em·
ployed and the conclusions drawn by the City with re·
spect to runoff and precipitation.

The District Court noted that the City's Exhibit
P-48, which plots Little Cottonwood effective precipi·
tation against Little Cottonwood runoff, is based upon
measurements of precipitation which falls in Big Cot·
tonwood Canyon. The isohyetal maps introduced by the
City showed that Little Cottonwood precipitation ex·
ceeds that in Big Cottonwood Canyon by about IO
inches per year. The court understandably concluded
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that it is suspect under such circumstances to compare
Big Cottonwood precipitation against Little Cottonwood runoff. ( R. 4G4-G5). The trial court also noted
that the precipitation maps utilized by the City reflected
any deficiencies which were present in the records from
which the maps were compiled. Although there are
snow measuring courses in the watersheds involved,
there is only one rain measurement station ( Sih,er Lake,
above Brighton) in the Big Cottonwood-Little Cottonwood area and onl,1} one on the Park City side. (R. 36970, 'fr. 14fiD-70). Moreover, much of Big Cottonwood Canyon is covered with highly porous glacial
material (Tr. 1.503, 3452, 3519), and in computing the
amount of water which drains from the Thaynes Canyon watershed the City did not take account of the
waters being discharged from the extensive tunnels and
mine workings underlying the area. (Tr. 1036-38).
The City's runoff per square mile comparisons on
Exhibit P-60 utilize, with respect to Argenta, the 30<lay period between October 15 and November 15. "\Vith
respect to the comparison areas, however, the exhibit
uses the 60-day period from September 15 to N ovember 15. The trial court observed that if the additional
30-day period is one of greater runoff, the effect would
be to show unjustifiably low runoff figures for Argenta. (R. 457). Defendant's Exhibit H, a climatic
summary for \\T estern Utah, published by the U.S.
Weather Bureau and covering years up to 1930, notes
that due to the effect of mountains on moisture-bearing
winds, Silver Lake receives nearly twice as much precipitation as does Park City, even though they are only
five miles apart. (R. 409-10).
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Again it is clear that the trial court had more than
adequate grounds upon which to discount the City's
evidence, particularly in light of the additional material
summarized in sections 7 ancl 8 below.
The Earl,11 rnao's JVas A Period Of 1'ransition 1fTith Respect To Runoff And Precipitation.
Through its evidence on runoff and precipitation, the
City attemptecl to demonstrate that beginning in the
early 1930's Big Cottonwood runoff had declined from
what it theoretically should have been. In making this
assertion the City wholly neglected to take account of
the transitory nature of that point in time.

7.

Exhibit P-11, a U.S.G.S. compilation of records
of surface waters up to 1950, states that water supplies
in the Great Basin show a downward trend between
1900 and the drought of the 1930's and that during such
period the average decline for many streams was more
than 50%. The publication further notes that runoff
from the VVasatch Front for 1924-1941 was 35% less
than for 1906-H>23 and that although water supplies
during 194-0-19:50 increased considerably over those of
the drought period, they still did not reach the 1906rn23 levels. (R. 403). In Exhibit N, a Hydrometeorological Study of Great Salt Lake (Bulletin G3 of the
Utah Engineering Experiment Station), it is stated
that for streams in the 'Vest the more recent data show
less runoff per unit of precipitation than was observed
in earlier years arnl that close investigation seems to in·
dicate that the early l930's
a period of transitio11.
(R. 403). Exhibit
also contains a double mass plot
of computed (theoretical) water year volume change
in the Great Salt Lake versus the actual volume change.
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In 1932 a break occurred, indicating a change in the
relationship between precipitation and runoff in the
area. (Tr. 1659-60). In 1932, when runoff at Argenta
reached its minimum, the precipitation at Silver Lake
reached the lowest point in the history of that station.
(R. 458).
Exhibit AA consisted of a graph showing the
average flows of ten streams before and after 1924.
The average for all ten declined by the following percentages during the period after 1924: Logan River
(32%), Blacksmith's Fork (38%), 'Veber River
(29%), City Creek (15%), Emigration Creek (31%),
Parley's Creek (28%), Mill Creek (27%), Big Cottontcood ( 25 % ) , Little Cotton wood ( 17 %) , and Spanish
Fork River (33%). The average decline was 30%. (R.
401-02). Exhibit Y (discussed under section 5, supra)
contained similar comparisons for six streams, but utilized three 18-year periods (1906-1923, 1924-1941, 19421959) in doing so. Both Exhibits AA and Y strongly
suggest that during the 1930's the flow of Utah streams
decreased from prior levels, but that the decline of Big
Cottonwood was not noticeahly different from that of
other streams. ( ll. 4()8) .
8. Influence Of Evapotranspiration. In its attempt to demonstrate an unnatural loss in Big Cottonwood the City also failed to consider the effect on Big
Cottonwood Canyon of changes in its vegetation.
Exhibit BBBB, U.S.G.S. Professional Paper
201, states that from the time of earliest settlement the
cutting of timber in the Cottonwood area was unre-

i

l
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strained and immense quantities were destroyed by
forest fires. ( R. 412). James Ivers testified that at least
between 1928 and 1933 large herds of sheep were allowed to graze in Big Cottonwood Canyon and that dur·
ing those years the grass and weeds in the area were
only six inches to a foot high. As of the time of trial,
the grass was between waist and shoulder high in many
areas. (Tr. 3179). Defendant's evidence tended to
establish, therefore, that the foliage which had been
eliminated from Big Cottonwood Canyon in earlier
times began to return in later years. As is detailed be·
low, the evidence clearly establishes that stream flow
radically increases when a watershed is denuded of
foliage and decreases as the cover replenishes itself.
Exhibit T, Paper 1848 entitled "Forests and Water
Yield," states that, since forests use large quantities
of water, water flow can be increased by cutting or
thinning a forest or its understory. The paper also cites
experiments indicating that logging operations have
resulted in stream flow increases of from 16% to more
than 60%. (R. 412-13). Exhibit U, an article entitled
"Evapotranspiration and Other Water Losses on Some
Aspen Forest Types in Relation to Water Available
for Stream Flow," reports that in a study conducted
near Farmington, Utah, removal of aspen trees re·
duced eva po transpiration losses from 22 inches to 18
inches, thereby increasing by four inches the amount of
water available for stream flow. (R. 4UJ). Exhibits V
and '"'" were other professional articles to the same gen·
eral effect. (R. 413-14).
Since the amount of water lost through evapo·
transpiration is a constant (so long as the vegetation
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of an area remains unchanged). any decrease in precipitation will result in a much larger percentage decrease in stream flow. (Tr. 28:30). Defendant's expert
witness on evapotranspiration, Frank Haws, testified
that through denuding of a forest area in the
asatch
l\Iountains an additional eight inches of precipitation
per year could be made available for stream flow. (Tr.
2761). Conversely, the refoliage of an area in the
Wasatch Mountains would result in decreased stream
flow. It seems only natural that the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek would decrease with the regrowth in
recent times of vegetation in the canyon.

'V

n.

The Geology Of The Areas Concerned ls Not
Such As JVould Facilitate JJT ater Flow From Big Cottonwood To The Spiro. In its Appellant's Brief the
City asserts that the evidence established that Big Cottonwood Canyon and the area into which the Spiro is
driven are geologically linked in such a way as to facilitate the transmission of water from one to the other.
A.gain, ample evidence to the contrary-summarized in
this and in the following three sections-was before
the trial court.
James Ivers, who was Defendant's President, a
mining engineer, and a man with extensive mining and
mining-related experience in the Park City and Big
Cottonwood areas, testified that in his opinion it is
highly unlikely that the Park City and 'V eber Quartzite Formations are acquifers. (R. 416, 418). Professor
Marsell, one of the City's own experts, testified that
the major conduits for water transmission would be
lacking if there were no sizeable fissures trending eastWest between the two areas. (Tr. 1521). James Ivers
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testified that his examination of many mines in Rig
Cottmiwood Canyon revealed very little distortion or
faulting. (Tr. 3414). He also stated that he has never
been able to detect any faulting running from the Park
City side into the Uig Cottonwood area. (Tr. 3412).
Defendant's expert Hoy Full, a geologist, also expressed his opinion that neither the Park City nor the
eber Quartzite Formation is an acquifer (R. 420,
Tr. 3468-70) and that the lack of major faulting between the Park City and Big Cottonwood areas creates
an effective harrier to the movement of water between
the two. (Tr. 3488). l\Ir. Full further noted that the
course of least resistance for water near the Spiro is
not toward Big Cottonwood Canyon, but to the east
where there are numerous broken zones. (Tr. 3486).
Both .James Ivers and Hoy Full were of the opinion
that the source of Big Cottonwood flow is not deep
seated, but is instead the mantle of highly porous glacial moraine which overlies the canyon. (Tr. !l-t.;32, :J;H9) .

''r

•Tames Ivers also provided detailed testimony regarding the total lack of water movement, or conditions
indicating such lack of movement, which he personally
had observed in numerous mines located in Big Cotton·
wood Canyon: (a) During pumping operations in the
Iowa Copper l\1ine, methane gas was found to be
present in standing water, indicating that the water had
been static for at least 50 years. (R. 435, Tr. 3389-92).
( b) The sharp break between oxidized and sulfide ores
in the Crystal Elgin Mine indicates that the water table
has not been lowered in hundreds of years. (R. 436,
Tr. 3393-95). ( c) The presence of extracted oxidized
ore and the lack of evidence that any pumping had
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occurred reveal that the Scottish Chief Mine encountered no water. ( R. 437, Tr. :J:J8(i-87) . ( d) The same
factors indicate that the area surrounding the workings
of the American Mine has been above the water table
for hundreds of years. (R. 438-39, Tr. 3382-85).
(e) Each year during the spring runoff water is
dammed behind debris in the Dawes Adit. The water
remains motionless, indicating that the Weber Quartzite into which the adit is driven is not an acquifer.
(R. 438, Tr. 3380-82). ( f) The Western Monitor is located on the Park City side of the divide and is driven
into the 'Voodside Shale. The lack of power for pumping indicates that no water was encountered. (R. 43839, Tr. 3396-98).
In deciding this case the District Court took into
account the foregoing matters. ( R. 470). This evidence,
particularly when combined with that discussed in the
following three sections, would appear more than ample
to substantially detract from the City's material relating
to geology.
10. The Source Of Spiro TVater Is Deep-Seated
And F'ar Removed F'rom An.1J Surface Area. Evidence adduced at trial tended strongly to indicate that
the waters of the Spiro have their source at great depth.
Defendant's witness Roy Full expressed that opinion.
(Tr. 3.514). The testimony of James Ivers was that
tunnel flow does not varv with the seasons. (R. 419,
Tr. 3198, 3514). Water flows encountered in the 143
Drift contained large amounts of nitrogen, but no
oxygen. Jam es Ivers stated that waters having a fairly
direct surface source will carry oxygen. (R. 419-20,
Tr. 3434-35, 3448, 3515). Ivers also testified that the
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Spiro waters enter from below, and in many places
"boil up" through the floor. (Tr. 3177, 3Hl5, 3514),
The opinion of Roy Full was based upon these con·
siderations and also upon the fact that flow from the
H3 Drift decreases as pumping is commenced at levels
below the tunnel. (Tr. 3514).
11. If 1Spiro Jr otcrs Did Not E.rit From, That
Tunnel They 1Vould Do So Elsewhere In The Park
Cit.I/ Arca. In discussing the numerous mine workings
in the area, .John l\Iason ]Joutwell in his Professional
Paper 77 on Geology and Ore Deposits of the Park
City District (Defendant's Exhibit S) noted that num·
erous of the mines all<l tunnels in the Park City area had
encountered large volumes of water, and that dewater·
ing the workings presented problems for many opera·
tors. (R.
The District Court observed that
long before the Spiro's time great quantities of water
had flowed from drain tunnels in the Park City area,
that the condition still exists, that there are over 1,000
miles of workings in the area, and that the Ontario
No. 2 drain tunnel, which is 600 feet lower than the
Spiro and was completed 20 years earlier, currently
discharges about twice :is much water. (R. 470, Tr.
3355-58, 3375). The evidence established that, given
the network of workings and faulting in the Park City
area, if the Spiro were Jlonexistent its \\aters would exit
elsewhere in the vicinity.
'Vhen pumping in the 'i\r est End Shaft ceased in
·1949, water began to fill the lower mine workings. The
level of water in the shaft stabilized at a point 171 feet
below the floor of the Spiro. When water from the '
Spiro was pumped into the West End Shaft in 1964
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the level could not be brought any higher than 123 feet
below the tunnel floor. 'Vith discontinuance of this
pumping the level gradually receded to the original
171-foot mark. Moreover, when water was being
pumped out of the shaft, flow from the 143 Drift decreased. 'Vhen pumping was discontinued, 143 Drift
flow increased. On these facts James Ivers expressed
his opinion that the waters of the 143 Drift and those
of the lower Silver King Mine workings are linked, and
that there is an outlet which maintains water at a level
171 feet below the Spiro. (R. 'J.70, Tr. Hl92-94, 336774). Ivers also testified that water was encountered
when the Silver King l\Iine operators attempted to
obtain more depth. Upon being diverted into old stopes,
the water disappeared and flowed to some unknown
point. (Tr. 3362). He also stated that with the discontinuance of pumping from shafts in the Ontario
Drain Tunnel the water rises from the lower workings
and flows out of the tunnel by gravity. (Tr. 337 4). And
water encountered in the Becon Shaft, when tu.rned
into a dry portion of the working, disappeared. (rr.
3439). Based upon the foregoing facts and his experienre in the area, James Ivers expressed his opinion that,
if the Spiro did not exist, its waters would exit elsewhere in the Park City area. (R. 419, Tr. 3209, 3442).
12. TVaters Flowing From The Spiro Are Not
Tributary To Big Cottonwood Creek. Even the City's
own witness Professor l\farsell admitted that where Big
Cottonwood water may go when it flows beneath the
ground is conjectural. (Tr. 1530, 3596). The evidence
summarized below strongly indicated that the Spiro
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Tunnel flows are not depriving-Big Cottonwood Creek
of its waters.
Between 1!)52 and 1!)61 Argenta flow declined
from 5,000 to 3,520 acre feet per year, but the yearly
flow of the Spiro remained substantially constant at
about 2,500-2,600 acre feet. During the same period
the winter flow of all \\T asatch Front streams except
Big Cottonwood decreased substantially from the prior
16-year period. Big Cottonwood flow increased by
18,000 acre feet over the earlier 16 years. (R. 456, Ex·
hibit P-61). Plaintiff's :Exhibit P-46 attempted to
demonstrate that between 1931 and 1955 the measured
runoff at the mouth of Big Cottonwood was about 22.09
cfs less than it theoretically should have been. During
the same period the approximate average flow from the
Spiro was 8.4 cfs. (R. 465-66). The District Court
quite correctly posed the question: If the City's data
is accurate, what happened to the rest of the water
which the City contends should have drained into the
Creek? (R. 466).

I

Exhibit PPP contained double mass curves plotting
the water year and winter flows of Big Cottonwood
plus all Spiro water. against the Wasatch Front Base.
The adc]ition of the Spiro water resulted in a break and
a sizeable divergence in the curve, indicating that if
the actual discharge from Big Cottonwood were aug·
mented by Spiro waters the flow would be ab1wrmally
high. ( R. 399-400) .

Defendant's witness .James Ivers gave his opinion .
that, based upon all the geologic evidence, the Spiro '
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Tunnel is not drawing Big Cottonwood waters. (Tr.
3207).
It might also be noted that the City's approach
to this entire lawsuit was somewhat myopic. N otwithstanding the multitude of tunnels and workings in the
vicinity of Park City, the Spiro Tunnel was the only
one in that area with respect to which the City made
any inquiry or study. (Tr. 1067) (Testimony of the
City's witness John 'Varel). Moreover, as was observed
by the District Court, neither John Ward nor Professor
Marsell appears to have considered the possibility that
Mill Creek may be the key to a connection, if any, between Spiro flow and Wasatch .F'ront streams: using
8- and 16-year flow comparisons, l\lill Creek has undergone a greater decrease in period flows than has Big
Cottonwood. ( R. 467-68) .
13. Conclusion. As the District Court noted in
its l\lemorandum Decision, its disposition of this case
was based upon all of the evidence and testimony which
had been presented. (R. 275). The evidence summarized
above, albeit by necessity not exhaustive, gives far
more than ample support for the finding that the City
fuile<l to prove that there hus been an unnatural decrease in Big Cottonwood flow since the driving of the
Spiro Tunnel. Accordingly, the Judgment below
should be affirmed. JVatkins v. Strong, 26 Utah2d 407,
490 P.2d 888, 889 (1971); Kartchner v. Horne, 1
Utah2d 112, 262 P.2d 749, 751 (1953); Silver King
Consol.
Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah 297, 39 P.2d
682, 694-95 ( 1934) .

(j()

POINT III. THE CITY WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S ANALYSIS
OF CITY EXHIBITS RELATING TO PRECIPITATION AND RUNOFF.

Several graphs were introduced by the City in an
attempt to show that beginning in the early Hl30's the
actual runoff from llig Cottonwood Canyon was less
than the "computed runoff" (the amount of water
which theoretically should have been discharged). In
determining "computed runoff" for purposes of its
graphs, the City employed a "carry-over coefficient"
of 11 %. Not all precipitation falling during a partic·
ular period contributes to runoff which occurs during
the same period. The purpose of a "carry-over coefficient" is to determine the amount of precipitation
precipitation") which actually contributes
to stream flow during the period involved.
In Point I of its Appellant's Brief the City stren·
uously objects to the manner in which the trial court
analyzed the City graphs dealing with "computed run·
off" and "effective precipitation." Looking only to the
presentation made hy the City, one comes away with the
impression that: ( i) The answer to whether or not there
has been an unnatural decrease in Big Cottonwood
Creek-the crucial question herein-was almost entire·
ly dependent upon e\'idence relating to computed run·
off; and (ii) If the trial court had not analyzed that
evidence as it did, the City's graphs concerning com·
puted runoff would have been accepted at face value.
Neither impression finds support in the record.
On the contrary, the record herein clearly and un;,
equivocally establishes that the "computed runoff

1

en
graphs com prised lmt a small portion of the evidence relating to the dispositive issue in this case, and that those
graphs had little, if any, probative value. Consequently,
the City was not prejudiced by the matters so forcefully
asserted in Point I of its Rrief.
In determining whether or not error is prejudicial,
the record in its entirety must be examined. Sec Thatcher
v. ill crriarn, 121 Utah 191, 240 P.2d 266, 268 ( 1952);
Knowlton v. 7'ho111pson, 62 Utah 142, 218 P. 117, 12021 ( 1923). A review of the evidence summarized herein under Point II, supra, enables one to decide how the
"computed runoff" evidence fit into this case considered
as a whole. The evidence bearing on the "unnatural decrease" issue was voluminous and of many, many types.
It included extensive flow records for numerous
histories were compared through the use
streams.
of a multitude of double mass curves. Methods of measuring the various stream flows and changes in those
methods were considered in detail. Substantial evidence
was adduced concerning the comparative hydrologic
characteristics of the streams under examination. ''ritnesses testified as to the pros and cons of the many and
varied methods, statistical and otherwise, used by each
party in graphically and mathematicaJly presenting
portions of its case. Evidence was introduced which related to precipitation patterns in the areas involved and
methods through which precipitation records were compiled. There was testimony relating to the effect of
evaporation and transpiration. Received into evidence
were models, charts, and oral testimony relating to the
surface and subsurface geology of Thaynes, Little Cottonwood, and Big Cottonwood Canyons. Similar evi-
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dcnce wns employed in describing the honeycomb of\
underground workings in the Park City area and the
various mines on the llig Cottonwood sirle. There was
extensive evidence concerning the water flows of the
Spiro Tunnel, when those flows were encountered, and
how they fluctuated. Evidence was considered relating
to waters emanating from the other underground work·
ings in the area. Various graphs, charts, and alternate
evidenciary devices were used to correlate or attempt to
correlate particular events or water flows which had
been depicted by other evidence. The parties elicited
extensive expert testimony with respect to almost all
facets of the case.
The City would have us believe that its "computed
runoff" graphs 'vere the crux of this lawsuit. In actuality, those graphs comprised but one bud of proof
sprouting from a fully Jea,'e<l evidenciary tree. All the
leaves, not just the one concerning computed runoff,
bore on the "unnatural decrease" issue. The computed
runoff graphs, considered as they must be in the con·
text of the entire record, were of no particular signifi·
cance. Accordingly, even
that those graphs
were to be accepted at face value, the minimal role they
played makes highly unlikely that a different result
woulcl luwe been reached in the absence of the alleged
error. This Court has often held that a reversal cannot 1
be predicated upon error alone, but must be based upon ·
error the absence of which likely would have produced
a different resnlt:
Only when there is error both substantial and
prejudicial, and when there is a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different

.
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without it, should error be regarded as sufficient to upset a judgment or grant a new trial.
Bowden

'l'.

Denver & R. G. JV. R.R. Co., 3 Utah2d

444, 286 P .2d 240, 244 ( 1955) (Emphasis added) ; see

Startin v. 11/adsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834, 836
(1951); In re lllcCoy's Estate, 91 Utah 212, 63 P.2d
620, 629 ( 1937); Knowlton v. Thompson, 62 Utah 142,
218 P. 117, 120-21 (1923); Utah Banking Co. v. Newman, 44 Utah 194, 138 P. 1146, 1148 (1914).
Even if segregated from the mass of evidence in
this case, the City's "computed runoff" graphs had
little, if any, weight. The evidence established that
those graphs could not be accepted at face value, as the
City implies they may.
In its Brief the City makes much of an assertion
that the 11 % "carry-over coefficient" used to determine
"effective precipitation" was placed in evidence by Def cndant and was accepted by both parties as accurate.
(Appellant's llrief, pages 24, 32). That assertion is
totally incorrect. In testifying concerning Exhibit P-45,
the City's witness John A. vVard remarked that it reflected the use of an 11 % "carry-over coefficient" for
Big Cottonwood Canyon which, according to the witness, ha<l been determined by one Eugene Peck. (Tr.
954). Later in the course of his testimony, while discussing Exhibit P-48, Mr. 'Vard stated that in the
preparation of that exhibit a a% "carry-over coefficient" had been used in determining Little Cottonwood
Canyon "effective precipitation." (Tr. 973-75). The
trial court admitted the evidence over Defendant's objection based on the hearsay rule. (Tr. 976).
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Later, in the course of presenting its own case,
Defendant introduced its Exhibit P in connection witn
the testimony of Albert Huber. That exhibit was a
duplicate of P-50 (one of the City's exhihits) and was
introduced to determine the statistical reliability of the
Cit,1/s graphs concerning "effective precipitation" ana
"computed runoff." (Tr. Hil5··18). Understandably.:
therefore, the "carry-over coefficient" employed in
hihit P was the same as that which had been used bvl
the City, and l\Ir. Huber so testified. ('fr. 1631-32).
In questioning the reliability of its opponent's evidence I
a party-here, the Defendant--certainly is entitled to'
assume for the moment the facts upon which the ques·
tioned evidence is based. By duplicating the City's
graph for purposes of disputing the City's methodology
Defendant hardly accepted or became hound hy one of
the ingredients of that evidence-the 11 % "carry-over
coefficient."
1

AH of the City's graphs relating to "effective pre· I
cipitation" and "computed runoff" were based upon
the use of Eugene Peck's carry-over coefficients. Thus,
since that gentleman was not present in court.• the City's
graphs were dependent upon a coefficient whose ac·
curacy and method of derivation could not be examined.
At the time Dcfernlant's hearsay objection was over·
ruled, the trial court noted that the hearsay nature of
the coefficients woul<l he kept in mind and would bear
on the probative value of the City's graphs. (Tr. 976).

I

Because of the purely hearsay nature of the City's I
11 % "carry-over coefficient," Defendant was not able :
to check its accuracy or to adequately examine the pro· ;
priety of using the coefficient as the City had done. 1
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Albert Huber testified that in computing effective
precipitation one should employ as many precipitation
stations as possible. (Tr. 1639-40). If only a few are
used, there is a significant chance that they will not accurately reflect the precipitation which falls on the entire watershed involved. Even the City's out-of-court
expert Mr. Peck apparently recognize<l this principle,
for he used nine or ten stations in determining his 11 %
carry-over coefficient for Big Cottonwood Canyon.
(Tr. 1645-46).
The precipitation data against which the City applied the 11 % coefficient was based on only one station
-that at Silver Lake. (Tr. 95-1<, 972-73, 1646). Silver
Lake is above Brighton and near the divide between
Big Cottonwood Canyon and the Park City side. (R.
324-26). Its elevation, 8,700 feet, is greater than most
of the canyon area, and the yearly precipitation at Silver
Lake is twice that which f all.Y on the lower reaches of
Big Cottomt•ood. (R. 369, 371). In determining "computed runoff" for the canyon, therefore, the City
utilized a precipitation record which greatly exaggerated
the amount of precipitation received by the canyon as
a whole. Small wonder that the City was able to demonstrate that the "computed runoff" for Big Cottonwood has been more than actual runoff.

1I

I
e!

.

Nevertheless, evidence which was elicited indicated that
the City improperly applied Peck's coefficient.

I
:

Serious deficiencies in the City's effective precipitation-computed runoff evidence were not limited to the
above. Albert Huber testified that a statistical analysis
of the "mean" line on the City's Exhibit P-50-the line
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used to establish "computed runoff"-revealed its loca·
tion to be wholly unreliable.- (Tr. 982-85, 1621-22),
l\Ioreover, in determining "computed runoff' from its
graphs, the City did not consider at all changes in vege·
tation which have occurred in Big Cottonwood Canvon
during its more recent history. (Tr. 965-67).
is
discussed under Point II ( 8), supra, the evidence was
only too clear that evapotranspiration has a tremendous
effect on runoff. The City's graphs also failed to take
into account the fact that the early 1930's was a transi·
tory period with respect to the relationship between
precipitation and runoff. (See Point II (7), supra).
And in arriving at thE- "actual runoff" figures against
which to compare "computed runoff," the City over·
looked all water discharged from the 'Vasatch Drain
Tunnel, notwithstanding that it is connected with the
Cardiff l\Iines in Big Cottonwood Canyon. (R. 294, ·
Tr. 826-27, 2799). Again, it is not surprising that Big
Cottonwood Creek flow was shown by the City to have
been less than "computed runoff."
1

As is demonstrated above, factors entirely inde· .
pendent of the trial court's allegedly erroneous analysis
of the City's "effective precipitation-computed runoff"
graphs established that such evidence had absolutely\
no probative value. lhsed as they were on a "carry-over ·
coefficient" which was pure hearsay, those graphs were
not even properly in evidence. Moreover, since the pre·
cipitation records underlying a1l of the graphs were ,
those of only Silver Lake, the "computed runoff" re· ·
fleeted bv the exhibits was highly exaggerated. The
lines used by the City to determine "computed runoff"
were shown to be totally unreliable. The graphs com· i
1

I
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pletely ignored the influences of evapotranspiration,
the 'Vasatch Drain Tunnel, and the transitional nature
of the early H)30's.
The result of the trial court's allegedly erroneous
analysis was the conclusion that the City's "computed
runoff" graphs had no probative value. That conclusion was dictated by evidence and considerations entirely unrelated to the error asserted by the City. Consequently, such error was not prejudicial, Thatcher v. lllerriam, 121 Utah rn1, 240 P.2d 266, 268 (1952); In re
McCoy's Estate, 91 Utah 212, 63 P.2d 620, 629 (1937);
Baird v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 49 Utah 58, 162
P. 79, 82-83 ( 1916), appeal
249 U.S. 587,
63 L. Ed. 790, 39 S. Ct. 385 (1919); Utah Banking
Co. v. Newman, 44 Utah 194, 138 P. 1146, 1148 (1914),
particularly in view of the protracted nature of the trial
and other proceedings in this case. See Jeremy Fuel &
Grain Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 60 Utah 153, 207
P. 155, 1.58 ( 1922). This Court has previously held to
be non-prejudicial errors of the type now asserted by
the City. Austad v. Austad, 2 Utah2d 49, 269 P.2d 284,
291-92 ( 1954) (Out-of-court investigation requested
by judge and used as evidence) ; State v. Donald, 90
Utah 533, 63 P.2d 246, 248 (1936) (Jury in criminal
case employed improper materials and procedures during deliberations).
Every feature of this case indicates that the error
asserted by the City did not prejudice it. Rather than
being required to prove all elements of the claim it had
made, the City, even though the plaintiff herein, had
merely to establish that Big Cottonwood Creek has
undergone an unnatural decrease since the driving of
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the Spiro Tunnel. The ruling of the trial court to this
effect was erroneous, but the benefit to the City was
substantial. Had the City been able to carry its minimal
burden, in order to retain any of the Spiro waters Defendant would have been required to demonstrate that
only a specific portion of those waters have their source
in Big Cottonwood. The difficulty in accomplishing
that task is apparent in view of the 1,000 miles of work·
ings, many of which drain water, in the vicinity of the
Spiro. The latitude accorded the City hy the trial court's
"unnatural decrease" requirement becomes even more
apparent when it is considered that the City waited over
30 years before first contending that the Spiro was
"robbing" Big Cottonwood of water. And in making 1
that clajm the City co1weniently ignored possible effects I
on Big Cottonwood Creek of the \Vasatch Drain Tun·
ncl.
I

1

I

In urging reversal because of the alleged error
committed by the trial court, the City fails to take ac·
count of the total picture. The evidence involved in this
litigation is undouhtedly some of the most complex and
highly technical ever to be considered by a court in this
State. The District Court spent 17 months grappling
with the geological and mathematical concepts with
which it had been presented. The resulting Findings
and Conclusions clearly demonstrate that all of the
dence had been ca ref;illy considered before a decision
was reached. In arriving at its decision, the court had
-the benefit of an on-the-spot view of the Spiro Tunnel
and the watersheds involved. The City's graphs relating
to "effective precipitation" and "computed runoff"
comprised but a very small part of the evidence relating

1
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to whether or not Big Cottonwood has undergone an
unnatural decrease. The record establishes that those
graphs were based on pure hearsay and had little, if any,
probative value. Considered in the context of the entire
proceeding and in view of the abundance of evidence
which supports the Judgment, the alleged en-or of which
the City complains was totally insignificant and clearly
not prejudicial.
CONCLUSION

As formulated and applied, the "unnatural decrease" burden-of-proof rule adopted by the trial court
was, with respect to the City, the most liberal and advantageous one possible. That mle was contrary to the
prior decisions of this Court and clearly was not justified by the circumstances present in this case. Nevertheless, in the end Defendant was not prejudiced thereby and, consequently, has here assumed the propriety of
the burden-of-proof principle employed below.
'fhe evidence summarized herein establishes that the
error about which the City so strenuously complains resulted in no preJudice to it. The alleged error related
to exhibits which formed but a small portion of evidence
bearing on the unnatural decrease issue. For reasons
entirely independent of those discussed by the City, its
"computed runoff" exhibits had little, if in fact any,
probative value. The record establishes that the District
Court had ample support for its finding that the City
failed to prove an unnatural decrease in Big Cottonwood Creek since the driving of the Spiro Tunnel. It
shows, in fact, that not only are the findings of the
trial court not "clearly against the weight of the evi-
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dence," IJTatkins v. Strong, 26 Utah 2d 407, 490 P.20
888, 889 ( 1971), but that such findings were dictateo
by the record viewed in its entirety. Defendant respect.
fully requests this Court to so hold.
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